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FEDERAL TAXATION: TAX COURT SANCTIONS
DEFERRED ACCRUAL OF FINANCE CHARGES
SUBJECT TO A POSSIBILITY OF ABATEMENT
IT HAS BEEN axiomatic since the incorporation of the accrual basis
in income tax accounting' that a contingent right to income cannot
be accrued. 2  The right to a specified amount of income" is said to
be certain for tax purposes only if all the events necessary to fix that
right to payment have occurred.4  Known as the "all events" test,
this requirement of an unconditional right to payment has been
criticized for its failure to conform to sound business accounting
practice. 5 In Luhring Motor Co.,6 the Tax Court held that finance
' The Revenue Act of 1913 taxed "the entire net income arising or accruing from
all sources in the preceding calendar year. ... " Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16 § II, 38
Stat. 166. This language, however, was interpreted to mean that only income actually
received could be taxed. Edwards v. Keith, 231 Fed. 110, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1916), cert.
denied, 243 U.S. 638 (1917); United States v. Christine Oil & Gas Co., 269 Fed. 458
(W.D. La. 1920). The accrual method of income tax accounting was incorporated into
the tax law three years later. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 493 § 13 (d), 39 Stat. 771.
Today, a taxpayer is permitted to compare income under any method of accounting
which clearly reflects his income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446(a). The accrual
method is expressly mentioned as acceptable. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446 (c) (2).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (1) (ii) (1957). See generally Goldstone, Aspects of
Recognition of Taxable Income upon the Accrual Basis, 12 TAXES 474 (1934).2 E.g., Barham v. United States, 256 F.2d 456, 457 (4th Cir. 1958); Breeze Corp. v.
United States, 117 F.Supp. 404, 407 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (dictum); 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATiON § 12.62 (rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS]; Comment,
Accrual: The Uncertain Concept of Certainty-A History of the All Events Test, 21 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 293 (1954).
3 The amount of income involved must be capable of determination with reasonable
accuracy. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (1) (ii) (1957); 2 MERTENS § 12.61 at 159 (1956); cf.
Gray, Synchronizing Deductible Taxes and Taxable Income, 9 U. CHi. L. REv. 442, 451
(1942).
' "Generally under an accrual method, income is to be included for the taxable
year when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income ....
The method used by the taxpayer in determining when income is to be accounted for
will be acceptable if it accords with generally recognized and accepted income tax
accounting principles and is consistently used by the taxpayer from year to year."
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (1) (ii) (1957). See, e.g., Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281
U.S. 11 (1930) (income from sales contract cannot be accrued until vendee is uncondi-
tionally liable for purchase price); United States v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 96 F.2d 756,
759 (10th Cir. 1938).
The all events test is also applied to deductions for expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
1 (c) (1) (ii) (1957).
5 Freeman, Tax Accrual Accounting for Contested Items, 56 MicH, L. Rv. 727, 732-
33 (1958). The author asserts that the test itself, as developed by the Supreme Court,
is in harmony with sound business accounting practice, but that its application by the
lower courts violates good accounting sense. Contra, Holland, Accrual Problems in
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charges attributable to a contract right did not meet the all events
requirement when, owing to business custom, such charges were
subject to possible abatement.
In 1955 Luhring Motor Company, an accrual basis taxpayer,
entered into numerous conditional sales contracts including pro-
visions for both a sales price and a finance charge. The finance
charges were prorated over the lifetime of the contracts, 7 but in the
event of early payment of the total sales price, the remaining charges
were customarily abated.8 The Commissioner declared a tax de-
ficiency for 1955 on the ground that the right to receive the total
finance charges was fixed as of the date the contracts were executed.9
This would have required the taxpayer to accrue all finance charges
in the taxable year of the contracts' execution. The Tax Court,
however, rejected this analysis and found that the right to such
Tax Accounting, 48 MICH. L. REv. 149, 181-82 (1949). Professor Holland argues that
some departure from accounting principles is acceptable if the all events test is to
provide a measure of certainty in an otherwise uncertain area.
Criticism lately has also centered around the rules that have been applied to two
particular types of cases: those in which the taxpayer has received income prior to his
legal right to receive such; and those in which the taxpayer sets up a reserve in
anticipation of subsequent expenditures. See Comment, 61 MICH. L. Rxv. 148, 155
(1962); Note, 61 HA.v. L. Rv. 1010 (1948). To govern the former situation, the courts
have developed the "claim of right" doctrine, which provides that a person who
receives payments under a claim of right, and who is under no restriction as to the
disposition of those payments, has received income for the purposes of accrual income
tax accounting. E.g., Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 188-90 (1957)
(advance receipt of membership dues); United States v. Schlude, 372 U.S. 128 (1963);
South Dade Farms, Inc., v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943) (advance
rentals); Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. 1026, 1032-33 (1955); see 2 MERTENS § 12.103, at
315 n.53, and authorities cited therein. This doctrine has been attacked on the
grounds that it does not allow a proper matching of income and related expenditures.
Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697, 700-01 (10th Cir. 1955); Heffern,
Claim of Right and Other Tax Doctrines Are Distorting Proper Accounting, 5 J.
TAXATION 20 (1956). However, the rule is justified on the grounds of federal admin-
istrative convenience, the desirability of a set standard, and a reluctance to run the
risk of subsequent taxpayer insolvency. See Behren, Prepaid Income-Accounting
Concepts and the Tax Law, 15 TAX L. Rav. 343, 363-65 (1960). The claim of right
doctrine has been expressly repudiated in subscription and membership dues cases.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 455-56.
For a discussion of the reserve cases, see note 35 infra.
42 T.C. 732 (1964).7 According to the court, this was "in accord with the accounting standards and
practices prescribed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants." Id. at
738.
8 "Although there is no express provision for abatement of finance charges in the
contract, the evidence is clear that it was the custom of petitioner, as well as other
automobile dealers in the environs of the [area] ... to abate the remaining unpaid
finance charges for the unexpired term of the contract." Id. at 743.
€9 Id at 739.
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charges was conditioned upon the absence of early payment due to
the custom of abatement. 10 Thus, the right to future finance charges
was not fixed within the meaning of the all events test, and the court
held that these charges should be accrued ratably over the life of the
contracts as payments became due.1
Historically, the accrual basis for income tax accounting was
established to avoid the distortion of income resulting from the use
of the cash basis by all taxpayers. 12 The combination of a graduated
tax rate with fixed periods for the determination of taxable income
necessarily imposed a hardship upon those parties whose receipt of
income was not spread evenly over the same period of time as the
income was earned. The all events test, on the other hand, was sub-
sequently developed to prevent the use of those business accrual
methods which tended either to distort income in the taxpayer's
favor or to involve the Government in a process of "interminable
accounting."'8
The all events test is phrased in terms of the right to receive a
specified amount of income. 14 Courts have held that income should
be accrued at the moment when the taxpayer has acquired a legally
enforceable right to receive same. x5 If the legal right is contested 0
10 In summarizing the evidence, the court found that "purchasers in the area were
familiar with this custom with respect to conditional. sales contracts in the automotive
business, and petitioner would have been unable to compete for their business if it
had not abated such charges." Id. at 743.
211d. at 739, 746. As a preliminary to the bulk of its decision the court found that
the finance charges were in part interest and in part a carrying charge, and summarily
deferred accrual of the former on the grounds that interest by its nature accrues
ratably. Id. at 742.
22 Goldstone, supra note I, at 474. For example, a building contractor who received
a lump-sum payment for a construction job lasting several years would be taxed, under
the cash basis, on all income received in one year, even though his business expenses
deductions and work were attributable to a period of years. See In re Newman, 94
F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1938).
2 1919-1 CuM. BuLL. 217, 218; see G. E. HOLMES, FEDERAL TAXEs (1923 ed.). It has
also been suggested that the all events test was developed because of the failure of
taxpayers to present enough evidence to the courts indicating that their methods clearly
reflected income. Reiling, Tax Accounting for Repricing and Other Rcserves, 31
TAXES 990, 993 (1953).
21 Regulation quoted note 4 supra.
"'E.g., United States v. Delta Air Lines, 255 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1958); United States
v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 96 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1938); H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner,
90 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1937).
"eE.g., Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 382, 384 (6th Cir. 1941);
H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 15; Cold Metal Process Co., 17 T.C.
916 (1951).
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or the amount cannot be determined with reasonable accuracy,17 all
the events necessary to fix the right have not occurred. One notable
exception to the test has been presented in cases where a legal right
to receive rents or interest was not accrued due to a substantial
probability that the income would never be received.' 8 In these
cases, probable nonpayment was attributable to the debtor's or
lessee's financial distress.' 9
Only two cases prior to Luhring had dealt with the specific issue
of when to accrue finance charges, and in both instances the courts
held that execution of a conditional sales contract had not satisfied
the all events test.20 In both instances, the right to collect finance
charges was subject to a clear legal right of abatement 'by the pur-
chaser. 21  The parties had expressly stipulated in the sales contract
that early payment of the purchase price would abate remaining
finance charges,2 2 and in one case this right was conferred upon
purchasers by a state statute.23  In relying upon these cases, the
117See note 3 supra. In Luhring, the Tax Court sought to justify deferred accrual
by intimating that the total amount of the finance charges were not reasonably
determinable as long as they were subject to abatement. 42 T.C. at 741. See also
Gunderson Bros. Eng'r Corp., 42 T.C. 419, 427 (1964). Although the uncertainty of
abatement may lend support to this contention from a strict accounting viewpoint,
it begs the question for tax purposes. Since the amount of finance charges were fixed
in the contracts, the total amount of such charges could be easily calculated if the
court found that the right to such charges was fixed.
18 O'Sullivan Rubber Co., 42 B.T.A. 721, acd, 120 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1941) (interest);
Oregon Terminals Co., 29 B.T.A. 1332 (1934) (rents); see 2 MERTrNs 281 & n.41
(interest), 288 & n.64 (rents).
10 O'Sullivan Rubber Co., supra note 18, at 722-23; Oregon Terminals Co., supra
note 18, at 1332. One court has rationalized the exception by stating that under the all
events test, interest income "is not accruable as long as reasonable doubt exists as to
the amount that is collectible by reason of the financial condition or insolvency of the
debtor." Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 290, 292 (4th Cir. 1943). This
justification should not be taken to imply that these cases are consistent with the all
events test; the uncertainty of collection does not affect the existence of a legal right
to collect a specified amount. See Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S.
182, 184-85 (1934).
Where the certainty of collection is subject to the political whims of a foreign
government, it need not be accrued. Cuba R.R., 9 T.C. 211 (1947). It would appear,
however, that state governments are presumed to meet their financial obligations.
Georgia School-Book Depository, Inc., 1 T.C. 463 (1943).
20 Smith Motors, Inc. v. United States, 8 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5336 (D. Vt. 1961);
Gunderson Bros. Eng'r Corp., 42 T.C. 419 (1964).
22 Smith Motors, Inc., supra note 20, at 5338-39. Gunderson Bros. Eng'r Corp.,
supra note 20, at 427-28 & n.14.
22Smith Motors, Inc. v. United States, 8 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5336, 5338 (D. Vt
1961); Gunderson Bros. Eng'r Corp., 42 T.C. 419, 421-22 (1964).
23 ORE. REV. STAT. § 83.620 (1953); see Gunderson Bros. Eng'r Corp., supra note 22.
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Luhring court found that purchasers were entitled to abatement
because parties must be presumed to know and incorporate into
written contracts those business customs generally prevailing in the
area.
24
The court, however, did not purport to rely upon the Virginia
law of contracts to determine whether purchasers would as a matter
of law be entitled to abatement.25 All the taxpayer's contracts
expressly provided that the parties agreed only to those terms con-
tained in or annexed by writing to the written document.26 None
alluded to the possibility of abatement. Thus, an attempt to enforce
an abatement privilege might have been frustrated by strict applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule.27  On the other hand, there is au-
thority in Virginia case law which may support the Tax Court's
assumption that generally accepted business customs may be in-
corporated into contracts.28
Assuming, however, that local law would not have enforced a
right to abatement, it is arguable that the right to receive income
should not be accrued if it would significantly distort the taxpayer's
income.29 The Tax Court intimated that immediate accrual would
2,142 T.C. at 744.
25 No mention was made of state law. Instead, the Tax Court relied on pre.Erie
federal law (citing Hostetter v. Park, 187 U.S. 30, 40 (1890)) for the proposition that
business customs could be incorporated in contracts. 42 T.C. at 744.
20 The contracts read as follows: "This agreement constitutes the entire agreement
between the parties, and no waiver or modification of its terms shall be valid unless
written upon or attached to this contract and signed by the parties. No representations
or warranties are made by Seller that are not contained in this agreement." 42 T.C.
at 785.
27Under local law (Virginia) the parol evidence rule is accorded considerable
weight, Payne v. Jennings, 144 Va. 126, 136, 181 S.E. 209, 212 (1926), and the courts
specifically bar the introduction of parol evidence as to new terms that vary the
express stipulations of a written contract. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kelly,
252 Fed. 523 (4th Cir. 1918); Protestant Episcopal High School v. Parrish, 168 Va. 103,
190 S.E. 146 (1937); Jones v. Franklin, 160 Va. 266, 168 S.E. 758 (1938).
28 Although the parol evidence rule has been applied strictly by the Virginia courts,
see note 27 supra, there is precedent tending to support the Tax Court's opinion in the
area of business customs. [In one instance where the parties to a contract had not
specified the quality of lumber to be shipped, the Virginia Supreme Court stated:
"Parol evidence is competent to annex to a contract a custom or usage of the business
and locality known to the parties, or so generally and well settled as to be presumed
to be known to them, and with reference to which they must be deemed to have
contracted." Arkla Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. West Virginia Timber Co., 146 Va. 641,
650-51, 132 S.E. 840, 842 (quoting BROWNE, PAROLE EvDENCE § 57, at 216 (1893)). A
distinction between this situation and Luhring might be that parol evidence was
required to clarify ambiguous terms of the contract, whereas clarification of the price
terms was unnecessary in Luhring.
'The purpose of the all events test was to avoid the distortion of income, see
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produce such a distortion by taxing income which might never be
received, 30 and thus the decision may rest squarely on a policy basis.
The assertion that the taxpayer would be taxed on income which
might never be received, however, would not appear sufficient to
indicate a distortion of income under traditional tax accrual account-
ing. If the Commissioner's position in Luhring was sustained, the
taxpayer still would be entitled to obtain a compensating adjustment
by deducting abated charges as business expenses3 1 or business losses32
in the year of abatement. It is not inconsistent with tax policy to tax
income which might never be received. The same treatment, for
example, is accorded any business which anticipates a substantial
percentage of its accounts receivable to be negated by bad debts.83
If the taxpayer is fearful of bunching bad debts in a bad year, he is
permitted by the Internal Revenue Code to incur the deduction
ratably over a period of years through the use of a reserve. 4 The
predominant view of courts of appeals would permit the use of
reserves for other types of business expenses when reasonably calcu-
lated and well-documented.3
5
text accompanying notes 13-14 supra, and it would seem anomalous to insist upon
a strict application of the test where it would not clearly reflect income.
'o 42 T.C. at 745-46. The Tax Court relied upon language to the same effect in
Smith Motors, Inc. v. United States, 8 Am. Fed. Tax P.2d 5336, 5338 (D. Vt. 1961) and
Gunderson Bros. Eng'r Corp., 42 T.C. 419, 427-28 (1964).
'2INT. REv. CoiE OF 1954, § 162(a). "To be deducted under this section of the
Code, the expenses must be "ordinary" and "necessary" expenses of the business. The
Tax Court found that abatement was necessary as a matter of business survival. See
note 10 supra. It also determined that most automotive dealers in the area adhered
to the custom of abatement. See note 8 supra. The general test for determining what
is an "ordinary" expense is whether another business would do the same thing. See,
e.g., Commissioner v. Motch, 180 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1950).
82 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (a), (c) (1). Losses sustained by a corporation are
deductible under § 165 (a), and losses of an individual incurred in the conduct of a
trade or business are deductible under § 165 (c) (I). The deductions for bad debts
under § 166 and losses are mutually exclusive. Katherine J. Hanes, 2 T.C. 218 (1943)
and cases cited therein.
8
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166.
3' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166 (c).
"' In the reserve cases, some courts have retained the "all events" test and dis-
allowed accrual of a contingent liability. Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934);
Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. United States, 81 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1936); Readers' Pub.
Corp. v. United States, 40 F.2d 145 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 15 T.C.
424, 430-31 (1950). In recent cases, however, many of the circuit courts have per-
mitted the use of well-documented reserves to accrue expenses ratably. Denise Coal
Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930, 936-37 (3d Cir. 1959); Schuessler v. Commissioner,
280 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956); Ohmer Register Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 682
(6th Cir. 1942); see Hilinski v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1956); Central
Cuba Sugar Co. v Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1952).
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Thus, immediate accrual of income would not have distorted the
taxpayer's income to a greater extent than the immediate accrual
of income subject to the probability of bad debts. Another line of
authority not mentioned by the Tax Court, however, lends solid
support to the result obtained in Luhring. Courts of appeals have
recently recognized that methods of reporting income generally
accepted within an industry "should not be condemned for some
abstruse legal reason, but only when they fail to reflect income."30
Since the statute sanctions the use of any method of accounting
which is consistent and clearly reflects income,87 it would have been
erroneous in Luhring to require immediate recognition of finance
charges merely because the all events test was satisfied. The only
question presented in the case, therefore, would have been whether
the method was consistently used by the taxpayer.38
The Luhring situation highlights another instance where gener-
ally accepted accounting practices 9 may differ from established tax
accrual policy.40 Unfortunately, the Tax Court tended to obscure
the basic issue by failing to posit its decision on an interpretation of
38 Pacific Grape Products Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 862, 869 n.10 (9th Cir.
1955). In Pacific Grape, the taxpayer used the accrual method to report income and
adopted the industry practice of accruing income for all ordered goods regardless of
whether title had passed or the goods had been packaged and shipped. The court
quoted the following passage from a dissenting opinion in the Tax Court: "The
practice of disapproving consistent accounting systems of long standing seems to me
to be exceeding all reasonable bounds.... Methods of keeping records do not spring
in glittering perfection from some unchangeable natural law but are devised to aid
business men in maintaining sometimes intricate accounts. If reasonably adapted to
that use they should not be condemned for some abstruse legal reason, but only when
they fail to reflect income. There is no persuasive indication that such a condition
exists here. On the contrary, a whole industry apparently has adopted the method
used by petitioner." Pacific Grape Products Co., 17 T.C. 1097, 1110-11 (1952).
The Pacific Grape doctrine has been expressly approved in analogous situations, viz.,
the accrual of expenses, by at least two other circuits. Commissioner v. Fifth Avenue
Coach Lines, Inc., 281 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1960); Schuessler v. Commissioner, supra
note 35, at 724. At first the Tax Court appeared to recognize the doctrine's validity
in the context of industry-wide accounting practices, see Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp.,
26 T.C. 1, 19 (1956), but in a subsequent case inconsistent positions of the judges
reflected uncertainty regarding its application. Automobile Club of New York, Inc.,
32 T.C. 906, 916, 920-22 (1959) (concurring and dissenting opinions). In Luhring,
this uncertainty was manifested in the court's reluctance to apply the doctrine when a
convenient alternative such as the all events test was available. In light of the Luhring
opinion's shortcomings, it appears that the court is torturing one test to avoid another.
'
T INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 446 (a), (b).
38 In Luhring, the taxpayer had discounted his conditional sales contracts to a
finance company prior to 1955. Therefore, this was the first year in which he had
adopted the method of accruing finance charges employed by the industry.
3' See note 7 supra.
'
0 See note 5 supra.
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state law. Moreover, by adhering to strict accrual concepts, the
court avoided a decision on the alternative ground that accounting
procedures which are generally accepted by the accounting profes-
sion as well as the business community should be acceptable for tax
accounting purposes if used consistently and if such procedures
clearly reflect income.
